Amalrik, Andrei. Notes of a Revolutionary. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1982.
NB: He has a complicated reln. w/ western journalists. Needs them, but thinks they were manipulated.
Intro by Susan Jacoby: "My former husband, then the correspondent of the Washington Post, was among the minority of journalists who were willing to meet with dissenters. Most of the press corps was content to get its "unofficial" news secondhand, from less timid. Andrei Amalrik, who was a reliable source of news about official persecution of other dissenters, was the first--and for many years the only-- Russian dissident to discuss publicly what he considered to be the inadequacy of western news reporting from Moscow." (A, xii-xiii)
Ginzburg asks for help getting in touch w/ the west
" But I never asked him to let me read it, partly so that if an investigator asked me if I had seen it, I couls say I knew nothing about it. I figured the authorities would not stand upon ceremony with either Ginzburg or me. And apparently Ginzburb had the same idea, which might explain why he didn't risk going to see the foreign correspondent. Or perhaps he thought the latter would be frightened if he came to see him. Because in those days, all of us were a little afraid: afraid of the regime; afraid that people who feared the regime would take us for provocateurs; and afraid of provocateurs.
Nonetheless, I agreed to put the correspondent in touch with Ginzburg and thereby took upon myself to a role that I played until the autumn of 1969--a role that involved me, to some extent, in what was later called the Democratic Movement...Ginzburg met with the journalist at our place. Since my wife and I had no curtains for our windows, we came up with a naive conspiratorial strategy just in case someone tried to photograph us from outside: we covered the windows with paintings." (A, 3)
7: met W. through wife's arts
"The Soviet authorities are stern. They don't like girls' panties hanging on cherry trees, Russians going as guests to the homes of Americans, or foreigners buying and selling paintings. And above al, they don't like when foreign correspondents stay in Russia to long: because the longer a correspondent lives there, the better he understands the situation." (A, 9)
20: sets up interviews for Ginzburg's mother
2 generations of dissidents
"The 'generation of 1956' was influenced by de-Stalinization, by disturbances in Poland, and especially by the Hungarian uprising in October 1956. I recall my impatience while waiting for the news from Hungary. If at that time there had exited some organization that asked me to take up arms agasint the regime, I would have agreed without giving it a second thought. But there was no such organization.
The 'generation of 1966' was formed under the influence of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial of 1966, the Czechoslavak reforms of 1967-68, and (finally) the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The 'generation of 1956' was one of 'dropouts.' I use the word in quotes, because it is the Soviet press's favorite epithet for us. It can, however, also be used without quotes, because in fact we began our protests at such an early afe that we were not allowed to complete our education. Galanskov, Ginzburg, Vladimir Bukovsky, myself, and many others were expelled from universities on several occasions; in some cases, expulsion was either preceded by arrest or followed by it.
By contrast, the 'generation of 1966' consisted of 'establishmen' people. Instead of half-scholars, it included doctors of science; instead of poets who had never published a single line, it included longtime members of the Union of Soviet Writers; instead of "persons with no specific occupations,' it included old Bolsheviks, officers, actors, and artists. For many of them, the years of 1953-1956 had also been decisive. But they still had hopes for improvement; and it was not until the unmistakable regression toward Stalinization in 1965-1966 that their inner dissent was strengthened and their protest provoked." (A, 21)
29: at a trial he met Karel van het Reve-Het Parol University of Leyden, published his books abroad
"Although it was against the law, the witnesses were taken out of teh courtroom after terrifying. even Galanskov's sister was removed. Such things made the atmosphere very tense. On the fourth day, near the courthouse, Larisa Bogoraz and Pavel litinov handed out to correspondents their statement: "To the World Public." That declaration was drafted in strong language. It demanded "condemnation of this shameful trial," "realease of the degendents from armed custody." and "stripping the judge of his judicial powers.
In one leap we had overcome a difficult barrier. We had addressed ourselves to public opinion rather than to the regime; and we had spoken up in the language of free persons, not in that of loyal subjexts, thereby overcoming a centuries-old complex: the idea that no Russian--and least of all, a Soviet-Russian should address apeals to foreigners. ("We are we, and they are they." "Don't wash your dirty linen in public." "It's better to get a blow from your master's club than a piece of bread from a stranger.") That same evening, on the BBC, we heard the statement translated back into Russian. Esenin-Volpin, sitting with the text in his hands, kept repeating: 'Right! That's it! Exactly!' Huddled around the radio, we resembled a painting we had been familiar with since our youth: Behind the Fascist Lines, Members of the Young Guard Listen to Radio Moscow.
The importance of the statement was understood in the West. It was reprinted, fully or in part, in many newspapers, and The Times of London devoted an editorial to it. The flow of statements and appeals that followed it during the next two months raised hopes that a social movement of sorts had surfaced in the USSR and that something would happen at any moment. It was rather like the hopes raised in 1956 by the theory of liberalization known as 'The Thaw.' (A, 31)
36-37: Attempt to hold press conference, KGB discovers it
"No foreign journalist in the USSR can really feel and believe that he is a "noninvolved" chronicler "looking upon both good and evil with indifference" primarily because he himself is an object of manipulation by the Soviet system. Naturally, the authorities realize they cannot manage the foreign press as they do the Soviet media. But to some degree they are able to control the information that foreign correspondents send abroad from Moscow. This accomplished in two ways: by isolating the correspondents and by employing stick-and-carrot policy. (A, 38)"-examples if need be
"The role played by foreign journalists in the USSR as a source of information has been, and still is, crucial. And many journalists, despite all difficulties, have resisted blackmail--a fact confirmed inter alia by the long list of correspondents expelled from Moscow in the past fifteen years...
Lots of thoughts on Western journalists, carrots and sticks-flogging
"We had been sending our declarations and articles to the outside world because that was hte only way we could make them public without censorship. Our aim was to give the world a better idea of the state of affairs in the USSR and to reach the Russian people via Western radio. And in that we succeeded. The number of listeners to foreign radio broadcasts increased several times over. We could not, of course, instruct the Western papers and radio stations how to publish and broadcast our material. And sometimes they wrote and broadcast the opposite of what we wanted people to hear." (A, 52)
59: VOA on Czech invasion
60: brings names of protestors
73: "In that cold spring of 1969 we often met with Anatole Shub of the Washington Post, who tried to convince me that the USSR would soon have to make some changes, however slight, in order to find a common language with the West. But Shub, as an American, had too much faith in common sense. The Soviet system is basically senseless."
74: Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?
84: Western correspondents assumed he was KGB
"They took it for granted that Russians were afraid to socialize with foreigners and that the KGB would send agents to contact them. From this it followed that a Russian whou held no official position and yet was so manifestly willing to meet with them must--or could--be a KGB agent. (A,91)"
91: search of Natalya Gorbanevskaya's house
92: "After Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? was published, I gave my first interviews to American correspondents: to James Clarity of the New York Times and William Cole of CBS...We established good relations with both of them and were invited to their homes for dinner on several occasions. (A, 92)"
"I regarded the interview with William Cole as very important, since it was the first TV interview weith a dissident and millions of people would be able to see an gear me. It was a terrible blow when I learned that the video tape had been confiscated Sheremetovo Airport. (It was shown at my trial as one of the most damning pieces of evidence.) I thought that Cole would be mortally frightened by all this, but he suhhested that we repeat the interview. I agreed, with the proviso that he not try and get the videotape out of the country himself. This time I invited Petr Yakir to take part, and he invite Bukovsky, and a taped talk by Ginzburg was smuggled out of his prison camp. (A, 93)"
93: CBS never shows it, it's in Russian , why people dislike America
"I have never understood the notion that Brezhnev is a "liberal," or what meaning his admirers attach to that word. After each crisis resulting in more power for Brezhnev, I was arrested. I was taken in after he became First Secretary in late 1964, after he prevailed in the crisis of 1970, and after he triumphed over his opponents in 1972-1973 in the matter of detente. Of course, there were many other involved besides me; it's just that each of my arrests was a symptom of increased repression. (A, 97)"
107-108-legality
"I told Kirinkin that in my opinion there was nothing either anti-Soviet or libelous in my writings, and that I would give no testimony during the investigation." (A, 108)
141: legality issues w/ the trial
142-143: getting statement to wife, it was eventually published in the Chronicle
Showing posts with label Czech invasion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Czech invasion. Show all posts
Saturday, October 22, 2011
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
Roth-Ey (Book) Vol. 1
Roth-Ey,
Kristen. Moscow Prime
Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold
War. New York: Cornell University Press, 2011.
Post WWII- radio starts coming in
"By 1955, the USSR was spending more on jamming than on broadcasting its own programs, and officials at the radio administration were discussing the possibility that, given both the amount of interference they were throwing up and the impossibility of percision jamming, they would soon paralyze the domestic radio network entirely" (Roth-Ey, 131)
132: Soviet Union produced the short wave radios
"The phenomenon of foreign broadcasting to the USSR was also a ringing testament to its modern, technologically advanced society and a backhanded compliment to its international importance. In the period the period 1963 to 1968, the USSR lifted jamming almost completely, even as Soviet media continued to rail against the enemy voices. To some observers it looked as if the Soviet authorities had settled in for a hostile, useful peace." (R-E, 133)
"They had not, because though the ideological category of enemy voices had its uses, to be sure, the reality of foreign radio broadcasting to the USSR did pose genuine, intractable problems. What the authorities objected to on the most basic level was information. Jamming practices varied over time, but by and large the Soviets did not attempt to jam broadcasts with purely musical content, nor did they typically jam programs in foreign languages not native to people in the USSR, such as English. THe programming deemed most offensive had to do with Soviet domestic affairs. This could be news of natural disasters of readings of literature banned inside the USSR; it could be first-person accounts from émigrés about historical events such as collectivization or analyses of Kremlin politics. In 1968, it was news of Czechoslovak heresy of "Socialism with a human face" and the subsequent crackdown the triggered the resumption of full-scale jamming. Foreign broadcasting delivered information that the regime did not want people to have, period, and this made hamming, however ineffective, its natural stance." (R-E, 133)
"Yet arguably it was the very fact of foreign broadcasting inside the USSR, and not the informational content of its programs, that spoke loudest of all. By breaking the Soviet regime's media monopoly, foreign broadcasting shattered the regime's hold on the modes and meanings of cultural consumption in Soviet everyday life." (R-Y, 133-134)
"Radio in the Soviet context was designed to educate , inspire and organize collectives; entertainment always took a backseat to edification, and information was to be provided on a need-to-know basis in life with longer-range political agendas. Broadcasting, in other words, was part of planned cultural economy that had little to do with popular taste or timeliness. By contrast, foreign broadcasters went out of their way to present themselves as the Soviet audience's intimate friend and a champion of its rights to information and satisfaction. Programming on foreign stations often mixed formats (news and music) and cultural registers (high and low, serious and silly) and promoted entertainment for entertainment's sake in a way directly counter to Soviet cultural hierarchies and to the idea of uplift. Finally, foreign radio modeled a very different relationship to that time than what was to be found in Soviet media; it was, in a word, timely, and as it delivered not just news but "breaking news," foreign radio told Soviet listeners that they wanted, needed, and perhaps even had a right to be up-to-date in a modern world." (R-E, 134)
135: party create cheap knock off
135: in 20s and 30s, some freestanding radio sets, "For the most part Soviet radio operated via a ststem of radio diffusion exchanges (radiouzly) that picked up signals (via long-,medium- and short wave broadcasts) and relayed them to wired units (radiotochki)" (R-E, 135)
'41: "7 million radios, nearly 6 million of them wired public amplifiers of one sort or another, and Soviet broadcast signals reached almost every corner of the USSR." (R-E, 135)
136: during the war, radio became part of daily life, it was also PUBLIC
"In 1941, the regime had confiscated all freestanding radios for military use (and also, it seems, for the purpose of walling off the population from foreign broadcasters), and this meant that even more than in the thirties, the locus of the Soviet radio experience was the wired public set. People gathered around these radios to get the latest news, but they also came together to hear Soviet literature's leading lights recite poetry and read the Russian classics..." (R-E, 136)
137: '55 "Soviet industry was pumping out several times more sets per year than had been produced in the entire prewar period." 33 million
'65: "more than double again" 32 radios/100 people
'63: no more wireless
"The shift from wired to wireless radio had far reaching implications that went almost wholly unrecognized at time. For one thing, it meant that that had been a predominantly collective and public activity was now moving into the realm of private experience and was thus far less simple to quantify, monitor, and control-indeed, it was beginning to look less and less like a traditional Soviet phenomenon altogether. ( Groups of listeners gathered to join a radio rally or attend a performance of radio theater were doing something that fit easily into the category of a Soviet activity, whether social cultural, or political. But could the same be said of the solitary listener at home) A second, even more critical issue about the wireless radios--and one that only served to heighten their potential un-Sovietness--was the fact that large numbers of these sets could receive shortwave broadcasts. In fact, according to a 1949 report to the party's Central Committee from the radio administration, nearly all of the freestanding radios being produced by Soviet industry had shortwave broadcasts. And as A. Puzin, the head of the radio administration of Glavradio, pointed out, this meant they were "designed for receiving not just the Soviet, but also foreign radio programs" devoted, in his words, to "the foulest slander of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. " Puzin recommended curtailing shortwave production almost completely. Nine years later, in 1958, the CC did its own investigation and found that production had not only continued but flourished: the USSR had produced more radios with shortwave capacity since 1949 than all 20 million radios in the USSR ready and able to tune in to foreign slander. At the time Puzin raised his alarm, there had been a mere half a million." (R-E, 138)
Why-WWII, also
"Wiring the vast expanses of Soviet territory for broadcasting, however, was an immense undertaking, even if the goal was to connect diffusion centers to loudspeakers and not individual homes. Radiofikatsiia using the wired system required three things in chronic short supply in the Soviet countryside: equipment, expertise, and perhaps most important of all, electricity." (R-E, 139)
-villages
139: consumer demand
140: "By the late fifties, as many as sixty different foreign stations were broadcasting to the USSR at certain times of the day. Jamming was worse than futile." (R-Y, 140)
high cost
"Nonetheless, the enemy voices could be heard with little trouble in more areas outside the centers of Moscow, Leningrad, and a few other large cities. Worse still, jamming operations made tuning in to republic and all-Union radio impossible in many areas: the Soviets were jamming themselves. With enemy radio the only thing to listen to, some klokhozniki were reportedly choosing to run the VOA and the BBC on their local wired networks. (R-Y, 140)
141: tuning wasn't illegal
143: Estonian study in '66 "up to 70% of radio listeners" listened to Finnish and other foreign stations
Lithuania '67 35%
'68 Central Radio: 50% at least occasionally
numbers inflated to make KGB mission look significant
"In closed-door meetings and in public settings, including in mass media, Soviet authorities regularly attacked foreign radio for corrupting listeners. The official list of corrupting influences from abroad grew long in the post- Stalinist era...But arguably, enemy radio had a place of honor in the official imagination. There were multiple divisions in the bureaucracy for transcribing and analyzing foreign broadcasts, and their reports, sometimes quite sophisticated, went to the in-bosex of party elites on a regular basis. Jamming although no longer a matter for public discussion by 1960 (it was on Glavit's, the main censorship agency, list of taboo subjects), was no secret, and people in radio and the party-state administration were well aware of how ineffective and injurious it was."
Radio Moscow 148-154
"Radio listening acquired its own disturbing undertones as of the late 1940s because of its association with foreign broadcasting. Radio was already moving in the direction of private consumption in the postwar USSR. Foreign radio, the enemy voice, pushed the point anc ould make all private listening seem more intimate and illicit."
158: details what was on Soviet broadcasts, it was boring
162: Soviet radio was "attitude to the fact" "The reality was that calibrating attitudes was a politicians' game, not a journalistic one."
170: Soviets couldn't go all night-censor
172:
"A 1968 survey by radio and TV's reseach bureau founf that 47 percent of people identified themselves as listeners to foreign radio (openly, the researchers notes); just under 10 percent described themselves as "regular listeners," while another 15 percent said they did not tune in themselves but heard about foreign radio broadcasts secondhand. The study was limited to urban regions, but inlike the Maiak survey, it covered multiple republics, it also gathered some interesting information on the tastes of listeners and their social profiles. The largest group of self-reported listeners was in the sixteen-to-thirty-year-old category; more men listened than women (52 percent to 41 percent), and most people listened at night. However there was no clear-cut correlation between educational levels and listening practices: aside from those in the lowest level (who had markedly lower rates), people of varying background reported listening to the foreign voices in rather similar numbers. Interestingly, when asked what they listened to on foreign radio, they split into two roughly equal camps. About 45 percent said they tuned in only for music and about the same number said they listened only to the news; 10 percent described themselves tuning in for both." (R-E, 172-173)
"Soviet researchers drew a direct connection between the inadequacy of domestic radio and the success of the enemy voices. 'The sluggishness and narrowness of the programs on Soviet radio, including on the First STation and Maiak, lead to a situation where a part of the audience is switching over to listen to foreign stations on either a regular or an episodic basis.' Listeners reported that they tuned in to foreign radio not only for what was unavailable from Soviet media sources but also for its timeliness. Here the researchers referred to an earlier study of Maiak to demonstrate just jow far off the mark the station was: fewer than 1 percent of the news segments covered events that had happened within the previous few hours, almost none were live, on-the-scene reports (o.5 percent of the total); about 25 percent of the airtime was given over to discussion of events or ideas with no clear time reference at all."
"They had not, because though the ideological category of enemy voices had its uses, to be sure, the reality of foreign radio broadcasting to the USSR did pose genuine, intractable problems. What the authorities objected to on the most basic level was information. Jamming practices varied over time, but by and large the Soviets did not attempt to jam broadcasts with purely musical content, nor did they typically jam programs in foreign languages not native to people in the USSR, such as English. THe programming deemed most offensive had to do with Soviet domestic affairs. This could be news of natural disasters of readings of literature banned inside the USSR; it could be first-person accounts from émigrés about historical events such as collectivization or analyses of Kremlin politics. In 1968, it was news of Czechoslovak heresy of "Socialism with a human face" and the subsequent crackdown the triggered the resumption of full-scale jamming. Foreign broadcasting delivered information that the regime did not want people to have, period, and this made hamming, however ineffective, its natural stance." (R-E, 133)
"Yet arguably it was the very fact of foreign broadcasting inside the USSR, and not the informational content of its programs, that spoke loudest of all. By breaking the Soviet regime's media monopoly, foreign broadcasting shattered the regime's hold on the modes and meanings of cultural consumption in Soviet everyday life." (R-Y, 133-134)
"Radio in the Soviet context was designed to educate , inspire and organize collectives; entertainment always took a backseat to edification, and information was to be provided on a need-to-know basis in life with longer-range political agendas. Broadcasting, in other words, was part of planned cultural economy that had little to do with popular taste or timeliness. By contrast, foreign broadcasters went out of their way to present themselves as the Soviet audience's intimate friend and a champion of its rights to information and satisfaction. Programming on foreign stations often mixed formats (news and music) and cultural registers (high and low, serious and silly) and promoted entertainment for entertainment's sake in a way directly counter to Soviet cultural hierarchies and to the idea of uplift. Finally, foreign radio modeled a very different relationship to that time than what was to be found in Soviet media; it was, in a word, timely, and as it delivered not just news but "breaking news," foreign radio told Soviet listeners that they wanted, needed, and perhaps even had a right to be up-to-date in a modern world." (R-E, 134)
135: party create cheap knock off
135: in 20s and 30s, some freestanding radio sets, "For the most part Soviet radio operated via a ststem of radio diffusion exchanges (radiouzly) that picked up signals (via long-,medium- and short wave broadcasts) and relayed them to wired units (radiotochki)" (R-E, 135)
'41: "7 million radios, nearly 6 million of them wired public amplifiers of one sort or another, and Soviet broadcast signals reached almost every corner of the USSR." (R-E, 135)
136: during the war, radio became part of daily life, it was also PUBLIC
"In 1941, the regime had confiscated all freestanding radios for military use (and also, it seems, for the purpose of walling off the population from foreign broadcasters), and this meant that even more than in the thirties, the locus of the Soviet radio experience was the wired public set. People gathered around these radios to get the latest news, but they also came together to hear Soviet literature's leading lights recite poetry and read the Russian classics..." (R-E, 136)
137: '55 "Soviet industry was pumping out several times more sets per year than had been produced in the entire prewar period." 33 million
'65: "more than double again" 32 radios/100 people
'63: no more wireless
"The shift from wired to wireless radio had far reaching implications that went almost wholly unrecognized at time. For one thing, it meant that that had been a predominantly collective and public activity was now moving into the realm of private experience and was thus far less simple to quantify, monitor, and control-indeed, it was beginning to look less and less like a traditional Soviet phenomenon altogether. ( Groups of listeners gathered to join a radio rally or attend a performance of radio theater were doing something that fit easily into the category of a Soviet activity, whether social cultural, or political. But could the same be said of the solitary listener at home) A second, even more critical issue about the wireless radios--and one that only served to heighten their potential un-Sovietness--was the fact that large numbers of these sets could receive shortwave broadcasts. In fact, according to a 1949 report to the party's Central Committee from the radio administration, nearly all of the freestanding radios being produced by Soviet industry had shortwave broadcasts. And as A. Puzin, the head of the radio administration of Glavradio, pointed out, this meant they were "designed for receiving not just the Soviet, but also foreign radio programs" devoted, in his words, to "the foulest slander of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. " Puzin recommended curtailing shortwave production almost completely. Nine years later, in 1958, the CC did its own investigation and found that production had not only continued but flourished: the USSR had produced more radios with shortwave capacity since 1949 than all 20 million radios in the USSR ready and able to tune in to foreign slander. At the time Puzin raised his alarm, there had been a mere half a million." (R-E, 138)
Why-WWII, also
"Wiring the vast expanses of Soviet territory for broadcasting, however, was an immense undertaking, even if the goal was to connect diffusion centers to loudspeakers and not individual homes. Radiofikatsiia using the wired system required three things in chronic short supply in the Soviet countryside: equipment, expertise, and perhaps most important of all, electricity." (R-E, 139)
-villages
139: consumer demand
140: "By the late fifties, as many as sixty different foreign stations were broadcasting to the USSR at certain times of the day. Jamming was worse than futile." (R-Y, 140)
high cost
"Nonetheless, the enemy voices could be heard with little trouble in more areas outside the centers of Moscow, Leningrad, and a few other large cities. Worse still, jamming operations made tuning in to republic and all-Union radio impossible in many areas: the Soviets were jamming themselves. With enemy radio the only thing to listen to, some klokhozniki were reportedly choosing to run the VOA and the BBC on their local wired networks. (R-Y, 140)
141: tuning wasn't illegal
143: Estonian study in '66 "up to 70% of radio listeners" listened to Finnish and other foreign stations
Lithuania '67 35%
'68 Central Radio: 50% at least occasionally
numbers inflated to make KGB mission look significant
"In closed-door meetings and in public settings, including in mass media, Soviet authorities regularly attacked foreign radio for corrupting listeners. The official list of corrupting influences from abroad grew long in the post- Stalinist era...But arguably, enemy radio had a place of honor in the official imagination. There were multiple divisions in the bureaucracy for transcribing and analyzing foreign broadcasts, and their reports, sometimes quite sophisticated, went to the in-bosex of party elites on a regular basis. Jamming although no longer a matter for public discussion by 1960 (it was on Glavit's, the main censorship agency, list of taboo subjects), was no secret, and people in radio and the party-state administration were well aware of how ineffective and injurious it was."
Radio Moscow 148-154
"Radio listening acquired its own disturbing undertones as of the late 1940s because of its association with foreign broadcasting. Radio was already moving in the direction of private consumption in the postwar USSR. Foreign radio, the enemy voice, pushed the point anc ould make all private listening seem more intimate and illicit."
158: details what was on Soviet broadcasts, it was boring
162: Soviet radio was "attitude to the fact" "The reality was that calibrating attitudes was a politicians' game, not a journalistic one."
170: Soviets couldn't go all night-censor
172:
"A 1968 survey by radio and TV's reseach bureau founf that 47 percent of people identified themselves as listeners to foreign radio (openly, the researchers notes); just under 10 percent described themselves as "regular listeners," while another 15 percent said they did not tune in themselves but heard about foreign radio broadcasts secondhand. The study was limited to urban regions, but inlike the Maiak survey, it covered multiple republics, it also gathered some interesting information on the tastes of listeners and their social profiles. The largest group of self-reported listeners was in the sixteen-to-thirty-year-old category; more men listened than women (52 percent to 41 percent), and most people listened at night. However there was no clear-cut correlation between educational levels and listening practices: aside from those in the lowest level (who had markedly lower rates), people of varying background reported listening to the foreign voices in rather similar numbers. Interestingly, when asked what they listened to on foreign radio, they split into two roughly equal camps. About 45 percent said they tuned in only for music and about the same number said they listened only to the news; 10 percent described themselves tuning in for both." (R-E, 172-173)
"Soviet researchers drew a direct connection between the inadequacy of domestic radio and the success of the enemy voices. 'The sluggishness and narrowness of the programs on Soviet radio, including on the First STation and Maiak, lead to a situation where a part of the audience is switching over to listen to foreign stations on either a regular or an episodic basis.' Listeners reported that they tuned in to foreign radio not only for what was unavailable from Soviet media sources but also for its timeliness. Here the researchers referred to an earlier study of Maiak to demonstrate just jow far off the mark the station was: fewer than 1 percent of the news segments covered events that had happened within the previous few hours, almost none were live, on-the-scene reports (o.5 percent of the total); about 25 percent of the airtime was given over to discussion of events or ideas with no clear time reference at all."
Tuesday, September 27, 2011
Uncensored Russia Vol. 4- Czech
95: R: "THe dramatic Sovietinvasion of Czechoslavokia on the night of August 20-21st, 1968, introduced a new dimension into the Soviet civil rights movement....The demonstration of August 25th and other acts of protest by Soviet citizens form the core of this chapter."
96: No 3. was 10 days after the invasion
99: protests begin
THey reprint a LEditor about the protest
-includes list of participants
-It's by the editor of Chronicle Natalya Gorbanevskaya
102: (7 and 5)- consequences of being a radical
104: Rise of self-immolation as a form of protest.
112-begins trials of the arrested demonstrators
113 (4) "As reported in the third issue of the Chronicle, seven people staged a sit down demonstration at Execution Place in REd Square on August 25th, 1968 as a protest against the sending of Soviet troops into Czechoslavakia (R, 113)."
Gorbanavskaya declared unfit
114-118: just how absurd the trial was.
119: The Soviet Press as a comparison
4: "Just like the official announcement the articles mention, in the first place, only one charge, that of violating public order: i/e/ the charge under article 190-3. Secondly, even this 'violation' is not described, and nowhere is there any reference to the fact that was a protest demonstration against the intervention of Soviet troops in in Czechoslovakia. Instead, the writers of these articles, not shrinking from direct liverl, give 'character sketches of the accused aimed at compromising them in the eyes of the reader (R, 119)"
159 (11): Gorbanavskaya arrested
96: No 3. was 10 days after the invasion
99: protests begin
THey reprint a LEditor about the protest
-includes list of participants
-It's by the editor of Chronicle Natalya Gorbanevskaya
102: (7 and 5)- consequences of being a radical
104: Rise of self-immolation as a form of protest.
112-begins trials of the arrested demonstrators
113 (4) "As reported in the third issue of the Chronicle, seven people staged a sit down demonstration at Execution Place in REd Square on August 25th, 1968 as a protest against the sending of Soviet troops into Czechoslavakia (R, 113)."
Gorbanavskaya declared unfit
114-118: just how absurd the trial was.
119: The Soviet Press as a comparison
4: "Just like the official announcement the articles mention, in the first place, only one charge, that of violating public order: i/e/ the charge under article 190-3. Secondly, even this 'violation' is not described, and nowhere is there any reference to the fact that was a protest demonstration against the intervention of Soviet troops in in Czechoslovakia. Instead, the writers of these articles, not shrinking from direct liverl, give 'character sketches of the accused aimed at compromising them in the eyes of the reader (R, 119)"
159 (11): Gorbanavskaya arrested
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